Digital fingerprinting is a means to offer protection to digital data by which fingerprints embedded in the multimedia are capable of identifying unauthorized use of digital content. A powerful attack that c& be employed to reduce this tracing capability is collusion. In this paper. we study the collusion resistance of a fingerprinting system employing Gaussian distributed fingerprints and orthogonal modulation. We propose a likelihood-based approach to estimate theinumber of colluders, and introduce the thresholding detector for colluder identification. We fin1 analyze the collusion resistance of a system to the average attack by considering the probability of a false negative and the probability of a false positive when identifying colluders. Lower and upper bounds for the maximum number of colluders Kma= are derived. We then show that the detectors are robust to different attacks. We further study differentsets of performance criteria.
INTRODUCTION
Due to the ease with which digital content can be accessed. retrieved and manipulated, there is a demand for methods to pmtect digital media and facilitate digital rights management. Digital fingerprinting is one such technique, whereby some unique information, such as a serial number, is embedded in media using watermarking techniques. One powerful class of attacks is collrcsion, whereby a coalition of users combine their different marked copies of the.same multimedia content in an attempt to attenuatelremove the trace of any original fingerprint. The fingerprint must therefore survive both standard distortions and collusion attacks by users intensing to destroy it. Several methods have been proposed in the literature to embed and hide fingerprints (watermarks) in different media:& 3, 51. The spread spectrum watermarking method proposed in [3] , where the watermarks have a component-wise Gaussian distribution and are statistically independent, was argued to be highly resistant to collusion attacks [3, 61.
The research on the collusion-resistant fingerprinting systems can be.hroadly divided into two main directions. One direction focuses on designing collusion-resistant fingerprint codes [ I , 9, IO].
The other direction of research is on examining the resistance performance of specific watermarking schemes under different attacks. .We are aware of only a few works on the collusion resistance.of digital watermarks [4, 6, 7, 81. Proposing a simple linear collusion attack that consists of adding noise to the average of 'K independent copies, the authors concluded in [6] that
O(-)
independently marked copies are sufficient for an attack to defeat the underlying system with non-negligible probability, when Gaussian watermarks are considered. It was further 0-7803-7663-31036 17.00 02003 IEEE shown [6] to be optimal: no other watermarking scheme can offer better collusion resistance. These results are also supported by [41. Stone suggested that the most powerful attack may succeed to defeat uniformly distributed watermarks if as few as one to two dozen independent copies are available [SI. We do not know of any work that provides a precise analysis of the collusion resistance of watermarks when employed with different possible detection schemes. This paper will address this issue. We employ some basic assumptions in this paper:
a We consider independent Gaussian watermarks. Furthermore, we assume that the fingerprints use orthogonal modulation, or at least the correlations among different fingerprints can be ignored.
a A non-blind detection scenario is assumed, meaning that the .host signal is available in the detector side. Analysis shows that 2 or 3 independent copies may defeat watermarks under blind scenario.
s The additive distortion is modeled as iid Gaussian noise. We begin, in Section 2, with the problem description and propose an approach to estimate the number of colluders. We then introduce the thresholding detector, and examine the collusion resistance of our fingerprinting system when considering the average attack and the criteria represented by the probabilities of a false positive and a. false negative. In Section 4, we further examine other types of collusion and two more sets of performance criteria. We refer the interested readers to [I I] for a11 detailed derivations.
A CLASSIFIER APPROACH
Additive embedding is a widely used watermarking scheme. As shown in Figure I , the content owner has a family of watermarks, denoted by { s , } and they are fingerprints associated with different users, for distributing marked copies to different users and allowing tracing of pirated copies to their original users. For the j t h user, the marked version of the content yj is computed by adding the watermark s j to the host signal x. Now the observed content y after the average collusion is where all vectors have dimension N, K is the number of colluders, andS,indicatesasubsetwithsizeK,whereS, 11, ..., n J w i t h n be the total number of users. The normally distributed fingerprint s j for each user j is assumed to have the equal energy and be orthogonal lo each other. The distortion d is assumed to be an N-dimensional vector following an iid N ( 0 , U:) distribution.
This paper was originally published in lhe Proceedings of the 2003 lEEE lnternalional Conference on Acoustics, Speech, & Signal Processing, the capability of adjusting parameters to meet a given PjP. Next we introduce the thresholding detector and study its collusion resistance under the average attack.
We employ the traditional correlator T N (~) and compare it to a threshold h. and report that the j -th fingerprint is present if T N (~) exceeds h. This simple approach is described as
where the set j indicates the indices of colluders, and an empty set means that nu user is accused. The threshold h here is determined hy such parameters as the document length N, the total number of users n, the number of colluders K, and the WNR.
Here the number of colluders K and the subset Sc are un- where T;"s are the order statistics qf the sample TN such that
DETECTION APPROACHES
In this section, we consider one of the most popular criteria, the probability of a false negative (P,,) and the probability of a false positive ( P f p ) . 
where 3, is the complementary set of S,. According to (8). we can numerically calculate h to yield P f p = L with given K, n. and WNR, and then compute the corresponding Pd.
We illustrate the resistance performance using an example, where WNR = OdB. N = lo', and U: = 1. In this example, the system requirements are defined as Pd 2 0.8 and Plp 5 lor3.
As shown in Figure 2(a) and (b) , when the number of users n is on the order of lo', the fingerprinting system can resist to up to 28 colluders: when n is set as a small number 75, the system can resist to up to 46 colluders. This behavior can be intuitively explained by the expressions of P f p and Pd in (8). To have an overall understanding of the collusion resistance of this orthogonal fingerprinting scheme, we plot the maximum resistible number of colluders K,,, as a function of the total number of users n in Figure 3 . It is noted that the system can resist to up IO n colluders when the total number of users n is less than 60. However. for a system accommodating more than 60 users, its collusion resistance starts to decrease. For a system accommodating more than one thousand users, the number Kna= is around 28.
Lower and Upper Bounds of K,,,
Since the above analysis is based on numerical computation. we shall study analytic hounds on the maximum number of colluders Kma= for an orthogonal fingerprinting system employing the thresholding detector. Setting U; = 1 for convenience, note that now llsll = J;im with the WNR 7 = l/~11'/11d11~. We restate the system requirements as
in which L is a small number and p is close to 1. A key point in determining K , , , is to figure out the appropriate threshold h in the above equation ( Some interesting observations are noted from this example. From the attacker point of view, if an attack can only collect up to 20 copies, he/she can never succeed in removing all the traces: however, an attacker is guaranteed to celebrate hisher success if 80 independent copies are available. From the owner (detector) point of view, if the owner has a mean to ensure that a potential attacker has no way to obtain as many as 20 independent copies, the fingerprinting system is claimed to he collusion-free. Meanwhile, in order to maximize the worst case of Pd, the owner should limit the number of independent distributions.
Simulations
Since the knowledge of K is normally not available in practice, we need to first estimate K before setting a threshold h for the detection process. Our simulations used the following implementation: 
3.
Apply the thresholding test statistic described in (6) .
We compare the simulation results with the ideal performance in Figure 2 (a) and (h). When K is estimated based on simulated observations. the resulting Pd always decreases with increasing K .
A good match is observed over the non-increasing part of the ideal case (when K is small). Mis-match is noted over the increasing part of the ideal case (when K is close to n), since K is under- We obtain the following It is interesting to note that the threshold h is a constant value determined by a,, and KmaZ is not affected by the total number of users n. If placing a larger fraction of innocents into suspicion is allowed, the system can resist to more colluders. Case 2: Capture All This set of performance criteria consists of the efficiency rate R, which describes the amount of expected innocents accused per colluder. and the probability of capturing all K colluders, referred as Pd. Here the goal is to capture all colluders with a high probability. The tradeoff between capturing colluders and placing innocents under suspicion is through the adjustment of the efficiency rate R. The system requiremenls are expressed as . .
We may find lower and upper bounds for K,,, under this criteria.
and an example is given in Figure 4 .
The analysis in this section reveals that the maximum number of colluders allowed is on the same order under two different sets of criteria. Basically, a few dozen of colluders could bre& down the Gaussian fingerprinting system using orthogonal modulation by generating a new composite copy such that the identification of the original fingerprints will unlikely be successful.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated how many independently marked copies of the same multimedia content is required for an attacker to thwart a fingerprinting system. We studied the collusion resistance of a fingerprinting system to the average attack when considering the performance criteria represented by PfP and Pnp.
We derived lower and upper bounds of the maximum number of colluders Km,,=. Using the upper bound, an attacker can know how many independent copies are required to guarantee the success of a collusion attack; on the other hand, an owner will benefit from these b u n d s in desienine a fineemrintine system. Our work a ,b Fig. 4 . Resistance performance of the orthogonal fingerprinting system under the criteria R and Pd. Here N = lo5. 7 = 1, a = 0.01 and Pd = 0.99.
the same content that can be distributed should be determined by many concerns, such as the system requirements, and the cost of obtaining multiple independent copies. Furthermore, it suggests that tracing colluders via fingerprints should work in concert with other operations, for example, suspecting a user leads the owner to more closely monitor that user and further gather other evidences.
